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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF CONSENSUS BUILDING 
APPROACH TO ENVRIONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
KOREA 
 
BY 
Kang- Won Lee 
 
This paper tries to describe the applicability of a consensus building approach to 
resolve environmental disputes in Korea by a comparative case analysis between 
the CALFED WUE program in U.S and the SAEMANGUM project in Korea. 
To reduce social cost due to prolonged conflict, conflict should be resolved not 
by confrontation and litigation but by appropriate alternatives including proper 
processes and methods. Regarding this, a consensus building framework is likely 
to be an appropriate alternative both in the U.S. and in Korea. This framework 
includes important factors: 1) mutual gains approach negotiation through all 
stakeholder involvement; 2) integration of stakeholder interest and decision 
maker’s concern into science information; 3) use of tools to generate agreement 
including stakeholder assessment; 4) the neutral involvement to design and 
manage the process to dispute resolution.  
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According to the result of two case studies, a consensus building framework is 
significantly effective to resolve the conflicts. The CALFED WUE program 
shows that there are crucial factors to resolve the conflict such as; 1) mediated 
negotiation approach; 2) joint fact-finding process; 3) tools to generate 
agreement (e.g. conflict assessment); 4) collaborative effort among stakeholders. 
In this case, a consensus building framework resulted in a successful outcome.  
In contrast, in the SAEMANGUM project, the lack of an appropriate process and 
methods ended up failing to get agreement such as; 1) bilateral negotiation; 2) 
zero-sum based negotiation; 3) absence of joint fact-finding process; 4) no tools 
to generate agreement (e.g. ground rules); 5) lacking collaborative effort. 
Regarding this, a consensus building framework would be one of the alternatives 
to overcome these shortcomings. 
 
However, there are several conditions needed to employ a consensus building 
approach for resolving a dispute over resource and environment filed in Korea. 
Key stakeholders should participate in a negotiation table and a well trained 
facilitator (mediator) should be present. In addition   proper resources such as 
time, finance, experts are needed and should be guarantied. The 
institutionalization of dispute resolution such as law is also important. 
 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Ⅰ.INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………..1 
A.BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY............................ ..........1 
B.RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.......................................................................4 
 
Ⅱ. CONSENSUS BUILDING FRAMEWORK………………………………6 
A. DEFINETION AND BACKGROUND………………………………………6 
B.THE KEY FIVE STEPS ……………………………………………………... 9 
C.THE MAIN TOOLS………………………………………………………….14 
D. USEFULNESS………………………………………………………………19 
 
Ⅲ. CASE ANALYSIS :……………………………………………………… 21 
CALEFED BAY-DELTA WATER USE EFFICIENCY PROGRAM DISPUTE 
A. PROBLEM CONTEXT……………… ……………………………………21 
B. APPLYING MEDIATED DIALOGUE …………………………………… 24 
C. ONE - DAY SCOPING SESSION………………………………………… 27 
D. INDEPENDENT REVIEW DELIBERATION……………………………. 30 
E. OUTCOME AND SIGNIFICANCE ………………………………………. 33 
 
Ⅳ. CASE ANALYSIS :……………………………………………………… 38  
 SAEMANGUM RECLAMATION PROJECT DISPUTE 
A.PROBLEM CONTEXT ……………………………………………………. 38 
B.LAUNCH OF JOINT INQUIRY COMMITTEE…………………………….40 
C.PUBLIC HEARING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE…………………43 
D.SETTLEMENT RECOMMENDATION BY THE COURT…………………47 
E.OUTCOME AND SIGNIFICANCE…………………………………………50 
 
 7
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………55 
A.COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO CASEES………………………….55 
B.USEFULNESS AND  
TASK OF CONSENSUS BUILDING FRAMEWORK…………………….60 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
1. The Characteristic and Efforts of Consensus Building Approach         20 
2. Tried Process and Methods of CALEFED’s Dispute Resolution          37 
3. Tried Process and methods of SAEMANGUM Dispute Resolution       54 
4. Comparison of Process to Dispute Resolution in two cases              60 
 
LIST OF FIGURE 
1. The Consensus Building Approach                                 14 
 8
Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Background and Purpose of the Study 
Nowadays as the Korean economy and democracy develops, with the expanded 
diversity of various social groups with different interests violently clashes with 
each other without reasonable settlement. In particular, conflicts between 
economic development and environmental protection are becoming urgent dispute 
cases because of the complexity and scientific uncertainty. For instant, the 
SAEMANGUEM project one of the most serious environmental conflicts has 
faced an impasse by environmentalist and the court.  
 
In part, those conflicts contribute to improve both democracies and 
environmental values. Environmental conflicts can be seen as a process to 
overcome the problem of government-dominant decision making process 
through public involvement. However it will not be desirable to continue 
prolonged conflicts which cause heavy social cost. In the end conflicts resulted 
in economic loss, social fragmentation and undermine finding the way to balance 
economic development and environmental protection. Thus, conflicts should be 
managed and resolved successfully. 
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No matter the scale, scope, or substance, all environmental and resource 
management challenges are characterized by the need to make difficult choices 
about how to value scarce resources and the need to cope with scientific 
uncertainty.1 Those conflicts also involve multiple parties with multiple interests 
and competing political priorities. For this reason, the settlement of 
environmental conflict seems to be difficult. Poor methods and just a willingness 
to resolve conflict can not guarantee a successful result. Indeed, what needed is 
to find the appropriate processes and tools which result in sound settlement of 
conflict. 
 
With regard to sound dispute resolution, the experiments in the U.S. would be 
helpful to Korea. In the early 1970s, a number of Americans tried to resolve 
public disputes including environmental conflicts through Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) such as negotiation rather than through political confrontation 
and litigation. In 1973 the Snoqualmie River Dam conflict, the most 
representative case at that time, was resolved successfully based on consensus, 
participation, integration and interested-based negotiation2. Since then ADR has 
                                            
1 ) Lawrence Susskind, Patrick Field, Mieke Van der Wansem and Jenifer Peyer, 
“Integrating Scientific Information, Stakeholder Interests, and Political Concerns in 
Resource and Environmental Planning and Management” Kevin S. Hanna, D. Scott 
Slocombe and others. Oxford University Press, Forthcoming, Fall, 2005. 
2) Dukes, Franklin E. Resolving Public Conflict. Manchester and New York, 
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been increasingly employed by people to resolve public disputes and it finally 
was legitimized in 1992. 
 
A consensus building approach, one of ADR in the U.S., seems an appropriate 
process and method resolve conflict in public dispute fields. This approach tries 
to offer a legitimate process and to arrive at sound agreement on environmental 
conflicts through trying the mutual gains approach negotiation. It also aims to 
integrate stake-holder’s interest, scientific information and decision maker’s 
concern. In addition a neutral mediator promotes productive dialogue among 
opposite stakeholders and enhances fair procedures on negotiation. According to 
the results of experiments in the U.S., it seems that a consensus building 
approach has the potential to resolve not only the value-based conflicts over 
natural resources, but the questions of fact that often delay or even overturn 
environmental decisions3. As we think of the characteristics of a consensus 
building approach applied to environmental conflicts in Korea, this approach can 
be seen as a means of appropriate conflict resolution. Most conflicts in the 
environmental field first resulted from the lack of stakeholder participation in the 
                                                                                                                             
Manchester University Press, 1996 
3)Seeing, Consensus Building Institute web, http://cbuilding.org, Lawrence Susskind. 
1999.”A Shot Guide to Consensus Building” The Consensus Building Handbook: A 
complete Guide to Reaching Agreement. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, and 
others. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
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early policy making stage. In addition, conflicts include the government 
involved as a stakeholder. So it would be better resolved if a neutral party 
contributed to enhance more fairness and effectiveness in the dispute resolution 
process. This, however, is still not activated and seldom employed by 
stakeholders. A consensus building approach can overcome those problems such 
as lack of stakeholder participation, and a poor dispute resolution process.   
 
This paper tries to describe the applicability of a consensus building approach to 
resolve environmental disputes in Korea. Further, I point out some tasks of 
employing this approach. 
 
B. Research Methodology 
At first, this research introduces a consensus building approach that confines its 
attention as a solution for environmental conflicts resolution in the U.S. 
Regarding this I  focus on what the characteristics of this approach are and how 
this framework has become a successful model in environmental disputes 
resolution.  
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Based on this, this research analyzes representative cases in the United States 
and Korea in the environmental conflict fields such as CALFED agriculture 
water use conservation program in the U.S. and the SAEMANGUM project in 
Korea. These cases have similarities both in the conflict’s properties and 
attempts to negotiate. It resulted in different outcomes, however, due to 
employing different processes and methods in terms of conflict resolution. It will 
show not only the concreteness of this framework but its availability on 
environmental conflict resolution in Korea.  
 
In addition, my review linked this framework to trends of environmental 
conflicts happening in Korea and demonstrates how this framework contributes 
to resolving them.      
 
In my research, I reviewed relevant materials including literatures, documents, 
and news reports and some interviews. 
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Ⅱ. CONSENSUS BUILDING APPROACH 
 
A. Definition and Background 
Consensus Building approach is the process of brokering or facilitating agreement 
among a representative group of stakeholders in any issue or conflict. This 
approach includes information gathering (i.e. joint fact finding) and a negotiation 
process that follows procedures or protocols that the parties themselves help to 
specify. The outcome usually takes the form of a written agreement. Because of 
the complexity generated by the number of parties involved and the technical 
nature of many of the issues under discussion, most consensus building approach 
need to be managed by a highly-trained “neutral” or mediator.  
 
Consensus involves seeking unanimity, but settling for overwhelming agreement 
only when every effort has been made to hear concerns of all participants and 
respond to them4. This approach has main three factors: 1) mutual gains 
approach negotiation; 2) generating agreement tools such as conflict assessment, 
joint fact finding, single-text negotiation; 3) mediation to design dispute 
resolution process and management. It has gradually five key steps to arrive at 
                                            
4) Lawrence Susskind and Jeffery Cruikshank, Breaking Robert’s Rules: The 
consensus building alternative to parliamentary procedure. Cambridge MA: MIT-
Harvard Public Policy Dispute Resolution Program, 2005  
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agreement in conflicts. Besides, this approach has been formulated through 
trying to seek ADR and improve decision making process operated by public 
participation and consensus approach. It was also theoretical and practical 
outcome to put science information into decision making process in the U.S. 
 
Since in 1970s, a number of experts in dispute resolution in the U.S. have tried 
ADR rather than traditional methods such as political confrontation and 
litigation. It basically attempted to overcome the delay time and the high cost. It 
is one of the ADR movements. In addition to a consensus building approach 
there was an effort to enhance democracy by improving the decision making 
process. In general, it has been acknowledged that “majority rule” and “vote” are 
main principle in operating democracy. However, a decision making process 
made by majority rule essentially faced not only an unstable outcome because of 
minority opposition but lack of legitimacy because of excluding the minority’s 
ideas. In order to get legitimacy and rationality in the decision making process, a 
consensus building process is much better than a majority rule process.   
 
Lastly, a consensus building approach has been developed to overcome the 
shortcomings of the NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) in the 
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environmental decision making process. The NEPA, passed in 1969, requires all 
federal agencies to asses the environmental impacts of major projects or 
decisions, the expenditure of federal money, or other actions that affect federal 
lands; to consider environmental impacts in making decisions: and disclose these 
impacts to the public. 
 
While NEPA has allowed the public to give input on thousands of projects, some 
have criticized the ability of the NEPA process to produce public policy that 
garner a high level of public satisfaction5. Although public input is solicited at 
various points, it has been observed that the public is not involved in a 
meaningful way in research, decision making, or implementation processes. As 
evidenced in the strategies used by agencies, “public involvement” often takes 
the form of simple notification, solicitation of public comment, or other types of 
one way communication6. A consensus building approach grew up as a means of 
overcoming the shortcoming in NEPA through putting stakeholder involvement 
into decision making process.  
 
                                            
5) See. : R. M. Solomon, S. Yonts-Shepard, and others “Public Involvement under 
NEPA: Trends and Opportunities” in Environmental Policy and NEPA: Past, Present, 
and Future, Ray Clark and Larry Canter, eds. Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press, 2000.  
6)Jenifer Leigh Peyser. “How does participation in the framing, Review, and 
Incorporation of scientific Information Affect stakeholder perspectives on Resource 
Management Decisions. 2005,    
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B.THE KEY FIVE STEPS  
A consensus building approach tries to get mutual gains, the concept that a group 
working together can create value and “expand the pie” of benefits7. This 
approach is distinct from compromise or “zero sum negotiation” which requires 
one stakeholder to give up something in order for another to gain. Mutual gains 
approach negotiation requires dialogue where parties are actively looking for 
ways they can meet each other’s interests at low cost to them. In addition, this 
approach uses both tools of promoting agreement and facilitation/mediation in 
designing and managing in the dispute resolution process.  
A full consensus building approach includes five steps8 (See Figure): 
 
1. Convening refers to the initiation of a process, including an assessment of the 
conflict or problem and barriers to its resolution. The “convenor” is the process 
sponsor, often a federal agency with regulatory authority. The convenor should 
involve a neutral facilitator to help identify the range of stakeholders and their 
                                            
7)See: Howard Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press/Harvard University Press.1982, D.A. Lax and J. K .Sebenius. The Manager as 
Negotiator. New York: The Free Press.1986, Lawrence Susskind and Patrick Field.  
Dealing With an Angry Public: The Mutual Gains Approach to Resolving Disputes. 
New York, NY: The Free Press, 1996.  
8) Lawrence Susskind. “A Shot Guide to Consensus Building” The Consensus Building 
Handbook: A complete Guide to Reaching Agreement. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah 
McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.1999  
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interests, whether or not a consensus-based approach is appropriate, and who 
should ultimately be “at the table” for the consensus building process. Before 
beginning work, the convenor and other participants should also secure sufficient 
resources to carry out the process. 
 
In the convening stage, stakeholders may highlight a need for capacity building, 
or training geared toward preparing participants for the upcoming process. 
Capacity building can include coaching in the consensus building process itself, 
to help participants learn how to work together productively. It can also have a 
substantive focus, targeting key scientific and technical concepts that will be 
dealt with in the deliberations, 
 
2. The next step is for the group to jointly clarify responsibilities of all 
participants, including the role of stakeholders, convenor, and facilitator. In a 
federal decision-making process, the role and participation options for the public 
at-large must be determined, in accordance with applicable federal regulations. 
Before addressing substantive issues, the facilitator will help the group establish 
agreed-upon goals and principles for their work, including ground rules, 
operating procedures, and timelines. 
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3. Once theses Key preparation steps have been completed, deliberations can 
begin. This is the phase that most people have in mind when they think about 
negotiations. At this stage, the group has already reached procedural agreements, 
and should build on these successes with a continued emphasis on relationship 
and constructive dialogue. A number of key principles of deliberation are that 
stakeholders should express concerns in an unconditionally constructive manner; 
engage in active listening; disagree without being disagreeable; and strive for the 
greatest degree of transparency possible. 
 
Documenting the agreement is a critical aspect of the deliberation phase. A 
written agreement serves not only as a “group memory”, but as a tool to 
communicate the agreement to each stakeholder’s constituency and other 
members of the public who were not directly involved in the process. A common 
method of documenting the agreement is creating a single, detailed report that 
outlines the group decision. This document would be considered a draft, and not 
an agreement, until all parties sign it. By creating draft agreements, parties can 
clearly see trade-offs they are making, and where the draft does or does not meet 
their interests. When parties disagree, a single –text allows them to be more 
specific about points of contention. Further, parties are encouraged to not just 
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disagree, but to articulate alternate language that is more acceptable. 
 
Fisher, Ury, and Patton describe the “one-text procedure” as a negotiation tool to 
help parties make a clear distinction between inventing options and final 
decision-making9. Parties may be more willing to be creative and experiment 
with possible agreements if it is clear that, by proposing a new idea, they are not 
committing to it. A single-text document is one example of a boundary object. 
Boundary objects are documents, such as tables, maps, text, or even a common 
vocabulary that can aid people from different disciplines build a shared 
understanding of an issue10. 
 
During deliberations, it may be beneficial for participants to consider creating 
subcommittees and involve experts. Subcommittees, or work groups, can engage 
in more in-depth learning about a particular subject, brainstorming, or document 
drafting. Subcommittees are not decision-making bodies and will always bring 
their work and/or findings back to the larger group. 
 
                                            
9) Fisher, Robert, William Ury and Bruce Patton. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without 
Giving In(Second Edition). Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.   
10)See S.L. Star and J. R. Griesemer. “Institutional ecology, ‘translations’ and 
boundary objects.” Social Studies of Science 19(3) : 387-420.1989  
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4. When deciding, groups should seek agreements that maximize the mutual 
gains to participants. Generally, the initial goal of a consensus building group is 
to reach full agreement. However it is also appropriate to seek overwhelming 
support on final recommendations if unanimity cannot be achieved after 
attempting to meet the needs of “holdouts.” In considering, the group’s final 
recommendations, the convening agency should note which groups did or did 
not support the decision and why. 
 
5. In the implementation phase, stakeholders must ensure that their 
constituencies ratify the agreement. In consensus building, the stakeholders at 
the negotiation table are always representing a larger constituency, such as 
association or advocacy organization. The success of a consensus building 
process and the decision phase in particular, is contingent on these larger 
stakeholder organizations signing off on the final agreement. Thus, it is 
important for representatives to maintain close contact with their “second table” 
throughout the process. Facilitators should encourage this communication, and 
representatives must be sure to take any proposal and final agreements from the 
consensus building process to the second table of their constituency.  
In implementing the agreement, the group should also consider how the 
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decision’s efficacy will be monitored. In the event that unanticipated issues arise 
as a result of the group”s decision, participants should also consider setting up a 
procedure to reopen the process and revisit the agreement. Finally, stakeholder 
groups should evaluate their own participation and consider “lesson learned” for 
their next collaborative effort. 
 
<Figure 1> THE CONSENSUS BUILDING PROCESS 
 
 
 
Source: Consensus Building Institute, 2002 
 
C. THE MAIN TOOLS GENERATING AGREEMENT – JOINT FACT 
FINDING 
 
In order to resolve conflicts of resource and environment, a consensus building 
Convenor initiates a Consensus Building Process
Convenor and Stakeholders Decide Whether or Not to Proceed 
Parties Create Value By Generating Options or Packages for Mutual Gain
Parties Distribute Valve in the Form of An Agreement
Appropriate Parties are Charged with Responsibility for Follow Through
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approach uses not only mutual gains approach negotiation but tools generating 
agreement. There are three main tools such as conflict assessment, single- text 
negotiation and joint fact finding in this approach. Since I mentioned above 
about two tools- conflict assessment and single –text negotiation, in this part I 
explain about joint fact finding. 
 
Joint fact finding is a consensus-based process by which stakeholders work with 
scientists and decision-makers to scope, review and incorporate scientific 
information into policy decisions. This process is quite useful to handle complex 
scientific and technical questions. There are six key steps in the process of this 
scientific inquiry.11  
 
Step 1: Assess the need for joint fact finding 
The convenor, in consultation with an neutral facilitator, should first assesses the 
need for an joint fact finding process, including a review of the scientific, 
financial and human resources that will be needed for a  successful 
collaborative inquiry. Convenors should identify the data gaps or scientific 
                                            
11)see, consensus building institute website, http://www.cbuilding.org, The MIT-USGS 
Science Impact Collaborative(MUSIC) website, http://scienceimpact.mit.edu. Jenifer 
Leigh Peyser. “How does participation in the framing, Review, and Incorporation of 
scientific Information Affect stakeholder perspectives on Resorce Management 
Decisions. Diss, MIT U, P41-56. 2005.   
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controversies that could be addressed by joint research. A neutral facilitator 
should aid in assessing the situation and the stakeholder’s perspectives. This 
assessment will aid in identifying a balanced group of potential joint fact finding 
participants. A balanced group should include stakeholders representing different 
sectors and viewpoints, resource managers who can speak to the “on- the –
ground” practicality of proposals and other agency representatives. Experts may 
be considered at this time, but they must be officially agreed to by the rest of the 
group after deciding to proceed. 
 
Step 2: Convene the joint fact finding process 
If all parties weigh the costs and benefits of joint fact finding and decide to 
proceed, convenors can invite the group to the table to begin the process. At this 
point, as called for by the consensus building process, the facilitator assists 
participants in developing ground rules and a work plan, including outstanding 
scientific questions and a timeline for their work. Additionally, participants will 
now jointly determine what kinds of expertise will be needed to help inform the 
decision-making process and which experts have the training and credibility to 
join the process. Before proceeding, all parties must understand sources of 
conflict, which questions are appropriate to deal with through joint fact finding 
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and what other issues must be considered in the overall consensus building 
process. 
 
Step 3: Scope the study 
After discussing which issues are of highest importance to stakeholders, experts 
aid participants in translating their concerns about knowledge gaps or conflicting 
information into researchable questions. Experts also help identify sources of 
existing information and appropriate methods of information gathering and 
analysis as well as the costs and benefits of different methods. Throughout 
scoping and all phases, participants must continue to tie the scientific inquiry 
back into the policy questions to ensure that their work will be relevant to the 
decision-making process. For example, beyond determining data needs and study 
design, joint fact-finding participants would also determine criteria for use in the 
decision-making phase. 
 
Step 4: Conduct the study 
As expert conduct the study as scoped by joint fact finding participants, they 
should draw on stakeholder expertise and local knowledge. This could include 
imputing a resource manager’s observational data into their models or learning 
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about a research site from a local stakeholder. Experts should also educate 
participants about complexities of their research and check back with them 
regularly with progress reports, data and draft findings. 
 
Step 5: Evaluate the results 
Following research, stakeholders, developer, agencies and the scientists evaluate 
the results. Together, these participants would discuss what the scientific results 
mean, including the assumptions and uncertainty levels built into the results. 
Given this information, joint fact- finding participants would determine how 
these results could be used most appropriate to inform upcoming decision. In 
developing the draft and final conclusions, participants should maintain 
transparency by noting the assumptions, uncertainties and limitations of the 
scientific inquiry. 
 
Step 6: Communicate the results. 
Participants should prepare key messages from their research findings to share 
with different stakeholder constituencies and policy-makers. Communications 
should convey that the research was scoped, conducted and evaluated in a 
collaborative manner and that all members of the joint fact-finding team are 
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behind the results. In addition, participants should listen to feedback from other 
stakeholders and determine whether additional research is needed, as the 
eventual policy outcome will affect a much larger population than those 
stakeholders directly participating in the process “at the table.” If joint fact-
finding efforts have yielded participants having the necessary scientific and 
technical information, they can feed this information into the larger policy-
making process. 
 
As a result of usefulness in joint- fact finding, this process is particularly suited 
to resource and environmental management and has been used for many 
environmental issues, including coastal zone management, watershed 
management and facility sittings.12 
 
D. USEFULNESS OF CONSENSUS BUILDING APPROACH 
Owing to characteristics of conflict such as its inherent complexity and scientific 
uncertainty in the scarce resource and environmental field, the efforts to resolve 
conflict should include substantial stakeholder participation and appropriate 
                                            
12)See: Scott McCreary, John Gamman, Bennett Brooks, Lisa Whitman, Rebecca 
Bryson, Boyd Fuller, Austin Mclnerny and Robin Glazer. “Applying a Mediated 
Negotiation Framework to Integrated Coastal Zone Management.” Coastal 
Management 29, 2001.   
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dispute resolution process and methods. A consensus building approach makes it 
possible to deal with those conflicts and can result in the legitimacy of dispute 
resolution process and sound agreement. Figure 2 notes how this approach can 
get the results in terms of process and outcome sides.   
 
<Table 1> Characteristics and Effects of Consensus Building Approach 
 
 
 
Component    Objective  Outcome 
 
 Mutual gains approach 
negotiation 
 
 
- To expand the pie through 
Interest-based negotiation  
- To get collaborative efforts 
among stakeholders.  
  
 
-Enhancing 
legitimacy and 
transparency 
of dispute 
resolution 
process.  
 
 
 
 
 
-Promoting 
more effective, 
efficient fair, 
stable 
agreement. 
    
  
  
Main tools 
generating 
agreement 
 
 
conflict 
assessment 
 
-To design appropriate 
dispute resolution process 
-Setting appropriate 
Stakeholders, issue, ground 
rule, work plan  
 
joint fact- 
finding 
 
-To get credible information 
in scientific and technical 
uncertainty. 
-To integrate science 
information into policy 
making 
 
single-text 
negotiation 
 
 
- To get written agreement 
document during 
negotiation. 
 
Facilitation/Mediation 
- To promote productive 
dialogue, fair process and 
agreement 
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Ⅲ. CASE ANALYSIS  
CALEFED BAY-DELTA WATER USE EFFICIENCY PROGRAM 
DISPUTE IN THE U.S. 
 
In this chapter, I try to analysis, the dispute resolution process of the CALEFED 
Bay-Delta Water Use Efficiency program13 (WUE program), a representative 
case in a resource and environmental dispute in the U.S., based on the method of 
consensus building approach.  
 
A. PROBLEM CONTEXT` 
The Bay-Delta system is an intricate web of waterways created at the junction of 
San Francisco Bay. The Bay-Delta is the largest estuary on the west coasts of 
North and South America, and home to many unique plants and animals 
including migratory birds and endangered fish. More than 22 million 
Californians rely on the Bay-delta system for all or some of their drinking water, 
and water supplies from this region are critical to the productivity of the 
agriculture and high-tech industries. 
                                            
13) At the beginning of Program, title of program is the CALFED Water Use 
Conservation. However, this title changed to Water Use Efficiency according to result 
of negotiation among stakeholders. This change includes a crucial meaning. I describe 
this later.  
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In California, conflict in the use water had been prolonged among users of water. 
In its early stage, conflict had been ongoing among agricultural users and users 
between agriculture and mining industry. Since the mid 1980s, however, conflict 
regarding the use water among agricultural users, urban users and 
environmentalists greatly increased because of the growing social need for 
environmental protection. This conflict also emerged among government 
agencies. While the state government in California was relatively focusing on a 
stable water supply-oriented policy, Federal agencies such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) focused on improving water quality and protecting 
endangered fish. Finally, conflicts in the use of water rapidly became between 
agricultural user and environmentalist, between state government and EPA. 
 
Under this condition, CALFED- the California Water Policy Council and Federal 
Ecosystem Directorate- Program grew out of the Bay-Delta Accord signed in 
1994 by then Governor Pete Wilson and the Clinton administration to address 
environmental and water management problems associated with the Bay –Delta 
system. Its mission is to balance the competing needs of environmental, 
agricultural and urban interests14. In order to carry out those missions, all parties 
                                            
14) See: http://Calwater.ca.gov/CALFDDocuments.html  
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such as federal, state agencies, agricultural users and environmentalist were 
asked to form a committee of the CALFED Program. Negotiation to form the 
CALFED program was started among stakeholders.   
 
However, CALFED Water Use Efficiency Program (WUE), one of the 8 
CALFED Program, faced more criticism from environmental, agricultural and 
urban stake-holders than any other part of the CALFED Program. Most criticism 
was directed towards conservation potential and was rooted in concerns that 
CALFED may be incorrectly forecasting conservation potential and therefore 
proposing an inappropriate mix of actions to improve water supply reliability. 
 
Even though CALFED Program aimed at balancing the competing needs of 
environmental, agricultural and urban interests in using water, negotiation 
among stakeholders faced a crisis to proceed. It was still the remaining conflict 
regarding of use water between agricultural users and environmentalists. Further, 
science uncertainty of water conservation potential caused more intensive 
conflict and broke negotiation between agricultural users and environmentalists. 
In the matter of water conservation, while agricultural users considered 
agriculture as contributing to water conservation through crops which store 
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water store in the land, environmentalist regarded agriculture as never 
contributing to the storage of water.  
 
B. APPLYING MEDIATED DIALOGUE- Restructure meeting committee 
and trust building 
To address the impasse on negotiation among stakeholders, CALFED convened 
an independent review panel and mediated dialogue on the WUE Program in 
1998. CALFED with CONCUR15 tried to find the way of getting successful 
implementation of WUE Program, they finally decided make an effort focusing 
on three factors:1) getting practical stakeholder participation; 2)searching for  a 
correct inquiry about scientific uncertainty; 3) getting feasible agreement.  
 
In early October, CALFED convened twelve stakeholders to mediated dialogue 
and CONCUR did confidential interviews of them individually. Those 
stakeholders, called the Agricultural Water Use Efficiency Steering Committee 
(Steering Committee), consisted of four members from each three parties such as 
agricultural user, environmentalist and CALFED. As a result of the confidential 
interviews- so called conflict assessment-, it turned out that the structure of the 
                                            
15) CONCUR is professional private company providing facilitation & mediation 
service in environmental conflicts. Information about CONCUR refer to website. 
http://www.concurinc.com 
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committee had several problems.  
 
First, a too wide-open meeting structure did not achieve solving the problem 
because of the absence of ground rules. The meeting was not held regularly and 
representatives of the committee often changed. Second, the poor 
communication skills did not get rid of hostility between agricultural users and 
environmentalist. Third, agendas were so wrong that stakeholders could not 
promote exchange of information and deliberate effectively. Nevertheless 
stakeholders were still willing to resolve conflicts to use of water through the 
committee of CALEFD.16 
 
For these reasons, CONCUR with CALEFD restructured the Steering 
Committee to get agreement on the WUE Program. First, CALFED made strong 
ground rules to achieve productive dialogue and changed representatives of 
stakeholders to get collaborative efforts. The number of participants was limited 
12 to 14, meeting was held regularly and representatives were asked to 
participate regularly. In particular, representatives participated in the negotiation, 
reselected not by being representative of a specific constituency but just by 
                                            
16)Agricultural Water Use Efficiency Assurances, Stakeholder Focus Group Issue 
Audit ,1998.  
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information delivery of broad constituencies. This allowed representatives to 
move off their position on issues and to promote free discussion and forming 
common base. 
 
Next, CONCUR changed the agenda to promote trust building and a common 
base among stakeholder representatives. Before direct discussion about how 
water should be used by users, representatives freely discussed their interest 
beyond their position and generating common terminology. It was crucial that 
representatives to the meeting shared their different terminology, information 
and perception. This resulted in advancing the discussion. The concept of “Water 
Use Efficiency” newly defined, resulted from generated a common base through 
free discussion among representatives. This concept has a crucial point to shift 
zero-sum based dialogue to mutual gained dialogue17. While the concept of 
water use conservation just focused on restraining water demand, water use 
efficiency focused on balancing both using water and storing water. Finally, the 
changed structure of agenda and dialogue to negotiation was essential allowing 
stakeholders to get agreement about CALFED Water Use Efficiency Program18.   
                                            
17)Boyd W. Fuller. “Mediating Irreconcilable Conflict: Agricultural Water Use 
Efficiency, CALFED and California”, 2003   
18)Scott McCrery, John Gamman and others. “Applying a Mediated Negotiation 
Framework to Integrated Coastal Zone Management” Coastal Management 29,2001.  
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In short, as a result of convening mediated dialogue, stakeholders could engage 
in trust building and discuss in a productive manner by making ground rules, 
reselecting representative and using interest-based dialogue. CONCUR, the 
neutral facilitator, moved stakeholders into improving negotiation skill and 
generating a common base such as water use efficiency.   
 
C.ONE-DAY SCOPING SESSION; DESIGN PROCESS FOR JOINT 
FACT FINDING 
CALEFED originally tried to resolve conflict about the environmental draft, the 
measure for water management and water conservation potential, through the 
independent panel’s deliberation not linked to stakeholders. Stakeholders, 
however, asked for the opportunity to reflect their concern before the 
independent panel’s deliberation. According to stakeholders’ requirement on 
October 19, 1998, CALFED convened a one-day scoping session to brief 
interested members of the public on CALFED’s rationale for convening the 
independent review panel on Agricultural Water Conservation Potential. The one 
–day session also offered an important opportunity for stakeholders, panelists 
and general public to provide input to CALFED on the structure and focus of the 
panel’s deliberation. 
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Lastly it turned out that the one-day session was essential to resolve conflict 
about water conservation efforts to both stakeholders and panelists.19 By the 
one-day session, both got benefits: 1) to improve understanding of purpose of 
panel’s deliberation; 2) to define what main questions should be solved by 
panel’s deliberation; 3) to reorganize questions offered to panelist. Further, 
stakeholders got a chance to select a technical advisor who participated in the 
panel’s deliberation and to attend the conference making the strategic plan. As a 
result of the one-day session, the process of the independent panel’s deliberation 
changed to a joint science inquiry among panelists, technical advisor, and 
stakeholders. This change of the panel’s deliberation resulted from CONCUR’s 
recommendation. CONCUR suggested that the independent panel’s deliberation 
should be conducted through all parties’ participation and through deciding 
policy based on accurate scientific information. 
 
At the end of the one- day session, the panelists asked CALFED to amend the 
questions examined by panel. They pointed out that the original questions - 
water conservation potential and measures for effective water management- 
should change to new questions- balancing environmental protection and water 
                                            
19) Scott McCrery, John Gamman and others, “Applying a Mediated Negotiation 
Framework to Integrated Coastal Zone Management”, Coastal Management 29, 2001 
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supply reliability- achieving the final purpose of Water Efficiency Program. This 
reorganized question contributed to providing movement overcoming adversary 
relationship among stakeholders and generating a common base by integrating 
stakeholders’ different interests. 
 
In addition, panelists noted that the measure of effective water management 
practices (EWMPs) made by CALFED was wrong because the measure was not 
linked to a specific and measurable objective. Agricultural users initially 
complained that EWMPs did not take account of regional differences of water 
potential. Panelist agreed on regional differences in Bay-Delta and emphasized 
that EWMPs should be in accordance with specific and measurable criteria.   
 
Based on the discussions during the one-day scoping session, the deliberations of 
the independent review panel were focused to accomplish several broad 
objectives20: 
 
Review, critique and provide recommendations to strengthen the technical 
assumptions and approach of the agricultural conservation sections of the 
                                            
20)CALFED Bay-Delta Program and CONCUR, Inc. Summary Report: Independent 
Review Panel on Agricultural Water Conservation Potential. P2-32, 1998  
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CALFED WUE component technical appendix. 
 
Provide guidance on strategies for identifying Bay-Delta problems, as well as 
structuring solutions and quantifying potential benefits. This discussion will 
center around representative case studies developed by CALFED staff. 
Identify additional data collection and research needs. 
 
More specifically, the panel will consider the following questions in meeting its 
objectives: Review conceptual model and methodology; Identify problems; 
Develop objectives and possible solutions; Choose preferred solution & quantify 
benefits; Research & data needs; Assurance. 
 
D.INDEPENDENT REVIEW DELIBERATION; JOINT FACT FINDING 
The independent review panel on Agricultural Water Conservation Potential was 
held December 14-16 at the University of California, Davis campus. This panel’s 
deliberation was underway based on the result of the one-day session held in past 
October.  
 
The panel was comprised of five nationally recognized scientists who 
 38
collectively provided expertise in the areas of irrigation science and engineering 
and aquatic ecosystem restoration. The deliberations also included eight 
stakeholder technical representatives with specific expertise in the Bay-Delta 
system. These technical representatives provided clarification on specific issues 
as needed and posed valuable questions and comments for the panel’s 
consideration. The panel was convened jointly by CALFED staff and 
CONCURS, Inc., a professional facilitation team. 
 
The panel’s deliberation first closed-door session was held by panelist, technical 
representatives, facilitated team and then the result of the session was open to the 
public including stakeholders. This process strengthened the deliberation through 
adding public opinion to experts and finally increased the legitimacy of scientific 
inquiry. There were also two key tools generating agreement employed in 
deliberation. According to ground rules, the facilitating team synthesized the 
result of each session by real time and deliberation also went off based on a 
single document. Owing to these tools, at the end of the panel deliberation, a 
written summary of the panel deliberation was made by the facilitation team. 
This summary was regarded as a draft of the agreement. 
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An agreement draft included important 10 components including changed 
methodology. The draft pointed out that there were crucial defects in the measure 
of effective water management practices (EWMPs) made by CALFED. The 
panel found that the current methodology should be refined to:1)estimate region-
specific conservation potential;2) incorporate a more elaborate analysis of 
evaporation and transpiration;3) include prescriptive information to guide and 
support planning on a regional basis.21 The water conservation potential should 
be determine based on water flow paths and describes the route that water travels 
to reach a problem area or another unusable destination. The conservation 
potential is different according to water flowing paths and the most practical 
strategy for managing water should focus on the flow paths. Further the practice 
for managing water should be controlled by offering specific and measurable 
objectives. Finally all stakeholders were satisfied with these recommendations 
and resolved scientific and technical uncertainty through independent panel 
deliberation which employed a joint fact finding process. 
 
 
                                            
21) CALFED Bay-Delta Program and CONCUR, Inc. Summary Report: Independent 
Review Panel on Agricultural Water Conservation Potential. P2-32, 1998  
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E. OUTCOME AND SIGNIFICANCE 
By ground rules in the panel deliberation, the facilitation team, consisting of 
CONCUR and CALFED staff, sent a draft summarizing the result of panel 
deliberation to the panelist in early January 2000. After being reviewed by the 
panelist, this draft was sent to all stakeholders and finally accepted as CALFED 
Record of Decision in August 2000. Ultimately, prolonged conflict between 
water supply reliability and environmental concerns were dramatically resolved 
and the collaborative efforts on CALFED Water Use Efficiency (WUE) Program 
started.  
 
How had prolonged conflict to WUE Program finally been resolved? There were 
several reasons which resulted in settlement. 
 
Collaborative Efforts to Resolve Conflict among Stakeholders 
CALFED was initially established based on principles such as “public 
participation” and “collaborative approach” to resolve prolonged conflict 
regarding water use and to making long-term measures for managing water. 
Even though the WUE program faced on an impasse due to scientific uncertainty 
and stakeholder’s opposition, CALFED did not abandon the principles of 
 41
operating. CALFED tried to overcome this impasse through independent panel 
deliberation, as well as, by convening mediated negotiations to get agreement 
about the WUE program. In particular, facing the need to amend the measure of 
effective water management practices (EWMPs), CALFED did not persist in its 
position and actively accepted the result of panel recommendation. In the same 
way, stakeholders to the last tried to resolve conflict through negotiation in the 
committee of CALFED.  
 
Employed Appropriate Processes and Methods  
The collaborative efforts among stakeholders to resolve conflict was one of the 
reasons resulting in settlement. On the other hand, however, this conflict case 
showed that there was also crucial limitation to getting a settlement in spite of 
collaborative efforts. Unless appropriated processes and methods did not employ 
negotiation, this conflict of water use would not have been resolved successfully. 
When prolonged conflict among stakeholders intensified with scientific 
uncertainty, there were something like process and methods needed: 1) to 
achieve a trust building among stakeholders; 2) to solve the science inquiry; 3) to 
generate agreement. 
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There were three key tools employed in CALFED WUE program conflict. First, 
by conducting conflict assessment, CONCUR, a professional facilitator 
corporation, with CALFED restructured the stakeholder committee more 
productively through selecting stakeholder representatives and making ground 
rules. Thanks to this, representatives maintained balance between reflecting their 
interest and trying for mutual gains approach and thus the meeting becomes 
more stable. Second, Joint fact-finding process solved scientific uncertainty 
about the water conservation potential successfully. Independent panel 
deliberation, attempted to solve the science problem, finally succeeded not only 
through all stakeholder participation such as panelist, technical representatives 
and CALFED but through jointly scoping, reviewing, incorporating scientific 
information into policy decisions. This process provided significant legitimacy 
to the process to resolve the dispute. Lastly, a single-text negotiation method, 
employed as one of the ground rules in this case, resulted in a written draft of the 
panel deliberation. After review by all stakeholders this draft becomes the final 
agreement. 
 
Mediated Negotiation 
The case of CALFED WUE program conflict showed that conflict with acute 
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confrontation among stakeholders and scientific uncertainty would be solved 
more effectively by mediated negotiation rather than by bilateral negotiation. 
Facilitation /mediation team contributed to promote discussion in a more 
productive manner, as well as to assisting in setting a well-designed issue, 
getting mutual gains negotiation and generating agreement. In this case, 
CONCUR reorganized agendas to enhance trust building among stakeholders 
and to generate a common base such as “water efficiency.” Further CONCUR 
designed panel deliberation to be carried out by all stakeholders participation and 
managed this deliberation effectively. Figure 3 outlined how conflict to 
CALFED WUE resolved. 
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<Table 2> Tried Process and Methods of CALEFD’s Dispute Resolution  
 
 
Structure of 
Negotiation 
Characteristic Mediated negotiation *Mutual gains 
negotiation based 
on scientific 
information  
 
 
 
*All parties 
Participation and 
Consensus 
building 
decision-making 
 
 
* The legitimacy 
of dispute 
resolution 
process 
 
 
Committee Integrating 
representative 
committee into 
independent panel 
Agenda Balancing water 
reliability and 
environmental 
protection  
Promoting Common 
Base(i.g,.water 
efficiency) 
Tools 
Getting 
Agreement 
Conflict 
assessment 
Refine representative 
committee and Making 
ground rules 
Joint-fact 
finding 
jointly scoped, 
reviewed, incorporating 
scientific information 
into policy decisions 
Single- 
text 
negotiation 
Promoting a written 
agreed document 
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Ⅳ. CASE ANALYSIS 
 SAEMANGUM RECLAMATION PROJECT DISPUTE IN KOREA 
In this chapter, I try to analysis the dispute resolution process of the 
SAEMANGUM reclamation project, a representative case of resource and 
environmental dispute in Korea, based on the method of consensus building 
approach.  
 
A.PROBLEM CONTEXT 
Since in 1991 the government propelled the SAEMANGUM project to produce 
farmland and fresh water, this project has faced intense opposition by 
environmentalists, religious groups.  For resolving this conflict, a joint inquiry 
committee between government and dissent groups tried twice, as well as, the 
court recommended both of them to settle but all efforts failed to get an 
agreement. This conflict has been going on with protracted litigation and 
political confrontation without dispute resolution. 
   
While, there was no conflict about this project in the beginning stage, intensive 
conflict has been emerging after the lake of SIHWA failed to produce fresh water 
in 1996. A number of people including environmentalists considered 
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SAEMANGUM project as the same example as the lake of SIHWA. This 
concern also resulted from increased consciousness of environmental protection 
since 1990s. Finally an anti-SAEMANGUM project movement has become a 
significant national issue since 1998. In January 1998, a committee of the new 
incoming president decided on a complete reexamination of the SAEMANGUM 
project. As a result of this decision, environmentalists asked the government to 
stop this project, as well as, to form joint settlement committee between 
government and the public. In addition, the governor of JUNBUK province also 
suggested establishing a joint environment inquiry committee. 
 
The overall reexamination of this project provided an opportunity to not only 
resolve conflict to this project by collaborative negotiation among stakeholders 
but to reduce exacerbating conflict to this project. There are main three points to 
consider in resolving this conflict. 
 
First, the discontinuance and modification of a previously propelled project 
caused a realistic negative effect. The SAEMANGUM project had already 
completed 60 percent of the whole project and more than one trillion won had 
been put into this project at that time. Accordingly, the discontinuance essentially 
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caused the debate about economic loss and seawall stability. This makes it 
difficult to resolve the conflict. 
 
Second, this conflict involved scientific and technical uncertainty such as the 
forecast of the scale in ecosystem destruction by making farmland and the 
estimated value of both farmland and tideland. These inevitably caused intensive 
debate among experts and made it difficult to get credible information. Thus, the 
agreement to science inquiry methodology should be made and the legitimacy of 
process is quite important.   
 
Third, this conflict included acute confrontation between interest and value sides. 
Thus real stakeholders should attend the negotiation and primarily trust building 
among stakeholders is quite crucial. Negotiation should be designed to 
effectively deal with difference of interest and value.  
 
B.LAUNCH OF JOINT INQUIRY COMMITTEE: FIRST NEGOTIATION 
TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
First effort to resolve the SAEMANBUM project started out by the launching of 
a joint inquiry committee between government and dissent groups in April 1999. 
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To resolve this conflict it is crucial that real stakeholder should attend the 
committee and agendas must be defined appropriately, as well as, inquiry 
method to examine scientific uncertainty has to be employed effectively. The 
first effort, however, did not achieve the above conditions. 
 
The members of the joint inquiry committee consisted of 20 private experts 
nominated by both government and environmentalist and 9 public servants to 
support the committee with one representative. An equal number of members 
from both sides did not attend the committee and a neutral expert never engaged 
in any group and stakeholder groups did not get involved at all. This 
composition of committee caused debate about unfairness of operation and 
adversary debate about science information among participants because of the 
absence of neutral experts. In general, experts nominated by stakeholders just try 
to reflect their constituencies and the result of debate among those is likely to 
fail to get agreement.22 In addition, only expert deliberation without involving 
stakeholders has a limitation to resolve this conflict.  
 
                                            
22)Kim Meyong Sic, “SAEMANGUM and Deliberative decision-making” 2001. 
Lawrence Susskind. “A Shot Guide to Consensus Building” The Consensus Building 
Handbook: A complete Guide to Reaching Agreement. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah 
McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1999.  
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Besides, the missed agenda could not guarantee to resolve conflict. Discussion 
about agendas such as “environmental effect”, “preservation of water quality” 
and “economic effect” essentially ended up as just matter between approval and 
opposition about this project. Under those agendas, negotiation could not 
promote mutual gains among different interest such as interest of regional 
development and of environmental protection. There were also no ground rules 
to promote productive discussion in meeting and dialogue generating trust 
building among stakeholders went off poorly. 
 
Further there was no system and measure to examine scientific information in 
the committee. The result of each discussion and inquiry about agendas was not 
shared with other session23. For instance, the result of discussion and inquiry 
about “environmental effect” was not input to discussion about “economic 
effect.” The most serious problem was that there was no agreement to adapt 
methodology seeking scientific information. Thus, it seems clear that this 
science inquiry completely was held not jointly but individually.  
Consequently, the final report about joint inquiry committee was submitted to 
government by representative without the final conclusion agreed to by all 
                                            
23) Che Mi Hee. “ Measure for integrating economic validity assessment of large 
public investment project and environmental assessment”, 2002. 
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participants in October 2000. This report, however, considered as the final 
conclusion by government. While this report was just the representative’s 
opinion, government used this report as the whole committee conclusion. This 
essentially caused intensive opposition by some of the participants involved in 
the committee. Environmentalist groups and private experts attending the joint 
inquiry committee spelled out that the representative of this committee 
significantly distorted the result of this committee24. The first effort to resolve 
the conflict ended up with no agreement and the relationship between both the 
government and dissent groups become more exacerbated.  
 
C.HOLD ON PUBLIC HEARING AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE: 
SECOND NEGOTIATION TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
After ending in failure of the joint inquiry committee about SAEMANGUM 
project, the political confrontation between government and dissent groups grew 
more serious. By this time, the Presidential Commission on Sustainable 
Development Republic of Korea (PCSD) asked the office for Government Policy 
Coordination (GPC) to review this project because of the defective result of the 
estimate of economic validity in this project. Finally the government decided to 
                                            
24)Civil Society Committee against for SAEMANGUM project. “A press interview for 
redressing the final report of joint inquiry committee in SAEMANGUM project”,2000  
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determine whether or not this project should continue on based on holding on a 
public hearing about issues and alternatives after that of the evaluation 
committee. After all, there was a second opportunity to resolve the conflict to 
this project by involving stakeholders. 
 
In May 7, 2001, a public hearing about three issues such as tideland, water 
quality and economic validity was held and discussion about those issues 
occurred by people who attended the joint inquiry committee and others 
including the public. After that, public hearing about alternatives of benefits to 
humanity and society took placed in the same way as hearing about issues on 
May 10- 11. On May 14 the evaluation committee met, This committee, however, 
met just one time  because there was no way to solve pros and cons and asked a 
subcommittee to write the report two times. Thus, the result of the evaluation 
committee was just that the President should directly decide whether or not this 
project should continue based on pros and cons pointed out by participants. On 
May 25, PCSD submitted the final report of the evaluation committee to the 
President and the government finally decided to resume the SAEMANGUM 
project that day. However, this final report submitted to the President caused 
serious opposition by environmentalist and people some of whom were the 
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members who attended the evaluation committee. According to this group, while 
the original report of the evaluation committee noted that the President directly 
should decide whether or not this project should proceed, because of there was 
no agreement in the committee, the final report submitted to the President 
indicated that the government not the President could make the decision.. In sum, 
even though there was no agreement in the evaluation committee and the 
President was meant to decide whether or not this project should proceed, the 
office for Government Policy Coordination (GPC) unilaterally decided to reopen 
the SAEMANGUM project. 
 
Even though the second effort to resolve the conflict in the SAEMANGUM 
project started to include the public involvement and to seek alternatives, the 
lack of science inquiry methods and the absence of legitimacy in process ended 
up fail to resolve the conflict. 
 
First, debate of scientific uncertainty in the SAEMANGUM project was not 
solved just by discussion in a public hearing. What was essentially needed was 
systematic scientific inquiry methods such as methodology and it was also to 
jointly scope, review and interpret the resultant information. There was no scope, 
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review and interpretation. Without this effort to seek scientific information, 
public hearing was likely to end up as adversary discussion. While discussion 
about pros and cons was going on, it was unable to get credible information. In 
addition, Discussion to alternatives in the project was likely to end up getting no 
agreement in the form of public hearing unless the credible scientific information 
was offered. 
 
Second, the lack of neutral experts such as science experts and a facilitator 
produced limitation to resolve the conflict in this project. Discussion about 
issues, alternatives went off by centering just stakeholders and the evaluation 
committee also proceeded by bilateral experts nominated. Under this condition, 
fact-based discussion was essentially unable to proceed and mutual gains 
approach negotiation was not easy. Even though there were no ground rules to 
promote agreement, it was unable to overcome this effectively. In general, 
searching for scientific uncertainty needed neutral experts, as well as, getting 
agreement on acute conflict needed well designed process by neutral facilitators 
to resolve conflict.     
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D.SETTLEMENT RECOMMENDATION BY THE COURT- The third 
opportunity 
Since two efforts to resolve the conflict of the SAEMANGUM project ended up 
in failure, the confrontation became protracted and serious. The Government 
established a new planning committee of this project and propelled this project 
by so- called environmentally friendly development in May 2003. In contrast, 
environmentalist groups sued for discontinuance this project in 2001 and 
religious groups had an anti-SAEMANGUM campaign in 2003. Under these 
conditions, Seoul administration court decided to stop implementing this project 
in July 2003. This means that the court first acted as one of the factors 
influenced in the conflict in SAEMANGUM project. 
 
Involving the court in the conflict in this project provided a significant meaning. 
For a long time the court was reluctant to get involved in conflicts of large public 
investment projects, It was, however, one of the key factors to resolve those 
conflicts in the SAEMANGUM project. According to the court judgment, the 
government had a trouble to advance this project. However, this judgment 
encouraged dissent groups in an anti-SAEMANGUM project campaign. In 
particular, in January 2005, the court tried to reconcile both stakeholders to this 
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conflict and recommended to settle the conflict by providing a third opportunity 
to resolve the conflict. However these efforts by court ended up in failure. In 
January 17 2005, the court provided recommendations to settle the conflict of 
this project: 1) establishing a committee under the President and National 
Assembly to discuss the purpose of land made by this project and range of land; 
2) composed of stakeholders; 3) stopping construction of a seawall until final 
conclusion was made. Regarding those recommendations, while 
environmentalist groups accepted, government did not. 
 
Consequently, the court finally ruled to repeal the approval of the purpose of this 
project in February 4 2005. Under this ruling, the government should submit a 
changed proposal of this project even though the government continued 
construction of this project. In the end, the government appealed to a high court 
and the environmentalist group appealed too. For more than three years, a legal 
argument to this project had continued, it could not solve the conflict. 
 
It seemed that there were several reasons for the government to appeal to the 
high court. First, the government persisted in its position as hard as a flint. 
JUNBUK province strongly opposed any settlement to restrict implementing this 
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project and the department of Agriculture also denied an alternative of part 
development offered by environmental groups.  
 
Second, government had a burden to stop this project. The high committee 
between government and the ruling party finally decided to appeal to the high 
court about the Seoul administration court judgment because of25:1) economic 
loss and a seawall loss by prolonged project discontinuance ; 2) reappearance of 
debate and conflict by changing the proposal of project; 3)  new plan to this 
project had already been established as environmentally friendly development 
reflected by previous two efforts. The position of the government was that 
enough discussion to this project among stakeholders had already finished and 
there was also no probability to get agreement in further negotiation.  
 
Third opportunity by court to resolve the conflict in this project failed because of 
government position was non-collaborative. It seemed that there was also no 
willingness to resolve the conflicts in the government. On the other hand, it 
turned out that the process of the legal system essentially has a limitation to 
resolve the conflict. The system of court action was not suitable not only to 
                                            
25) JoongAan daily, 29, January, 2005.  
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examine science uncertainty but to satisfy all stakeholders satisfy.  
 
E.OUTCOME AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The acute conflict to the SAEMANGUM project originally resulted from the 
early decision –making stage in this project. There was not enough according to 
the deal with environmental value and no public involvement to make a decision 
in the early stage. Since 1998, however, there were several efforts to overcome 
those problems such as the joint inquiry committee and the public hearing about 
issues and alternatives to this project and the evaluation committee was formed. 
In addition, a third opportunity by the court provided to resolve the conflict to 
stakeholders. However all efforts to resolve the conflict ended up in failure. 
There were several reasons for failing resolved the conflict. 
 
The lack of collaborative efforts to resolve the conflict 
Even though the government tried to resolve the conflict through a joint inquiry 
committee and public hearing and the evaluation committee, the government did 
not show a sincere attitude. There was no agreement after two the efforts and 
there was also opposition to the announcement about the result of the meeting. In 
part, it seemed clear that there was lack of legitimacy in the dispute resolution 
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process. However, the government denied extra meetings to resolve the conflict, 
as well as, distorted the result of the joint inquiry committee and the evaluation 
committee. In particular, the government rejected an alternative building of a 
high-tech physical distribution in land made by reclamation under seawater 
flows offered by environmental groups. It seemed that the efforts to resolve 
conflict by collaboration in government failed. In addition to government, 
environmental groups were likely to persist in their position. 
 
The absence of processes and methods for seeking scientific inquiry 
In the SAEMANGUM project, the scientific inquiry was quite important even 
though it was not easy. By reclamation, the forecast of the range in tideland 
destruction and the value of farmland and tideland essentially caused intensive 
debate about scientific and technical uncertainty among stakeholders. Thus, it 
was crucial that the credible data agreed by all stakeholders should be found and 
all parties primarily should agree on the methodology to examine scientific 
information. Overall appropriate process and methods for seeking scientific 
information should be employed. However there was no proper process and 
methods about science inquiry in two joint inquiries. First there was any 
agreement about the methodology to seek scientific information and there was 
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no scope, review and interpretation by stakeholders together. All scientific 
inquiry was completely individual. What is worse, in the joint inquiry committee 
the result of each session’s discussion to agendas was not share with other 
session’s inquiry. Second, science inquiry was done by experts nominated among 
stakeholders. There were no neutral experts in scientific inquiry. As a result of 
this, adversary debate to scientific information was just carried on instead of 
seeking non-objective fact. In particular, under those conditions the form of 
public hearing could not resolve conflict to this project. There was just debate 
about pros and cons in this project. Accordingly, it stands to reason that there 
was no agreement to scientific information.  
 
Zero –sum based negotiation structure 
In acute conflict with different interests and values among stakeholders, it seems 
that interested-based negotiation was more effective. Discussion about agendas 
such as “environmental effect”, “preservation of water quality” and “economic 
effect” essentially ended up just matter between approval and opposition about 
this project. Under those agendas, negotiation could not promote mutual gains 
among different interest such as interest of regional development and of 
environmental protection. This negotiation based on those agendas was likely to 
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be zero-sum based negotiation. In addition, to resolve this kind of conflict the 
effort at trust building was important. The effort to make common base resulted 
in a more effective outcome. There was, however, no effort to promote 
productive discussion in meeting and dialogue generating trust building among 
stakeholders. 
 
The absence of the neutral parties  
In the SAEMANGUM project, the neutral parties to reconcile acute 
confrontation and to promote productive dialogue was not asked to assist. This 
made it difficult to resolve conflict. The results of the two times the committee 
failed to get agreement those committees went off by forming bilateral 
negotiation. This reflects that conflict to this project would be better solved by 
supporting the neutral parties rather than bilateral negotiation. In general, public 
dispute cases including environmental disputes, the government usually becomes 
one of the parties involved in the conflict. In that case a professional offers not 
only fairness and legitimacy of the dispute resolution process but promotion of 
productive dialogue26. IF bilateral negotiation to resolve the conflict is difficult, 
                                            
26) Lawrence Susskind. “A Shot Guide to Consensus Building” The Consensus Building 
Handbook: A complete Guide to Reaching Agreement. Lawrence Susskind, Sarah 
McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications,1999.  
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it is needed to employ mediated negotiation.27 Figure 4 show how the efforts to 
resolve the conflict advanced.  
 
<Table 3> Tried Process and Methods of the SAEMANGUM Dispute 
Resolution 
 
 Joint inquiry 
committee 
Public hearing & 
Evaluation 
committee 
The court Characteristic 
Structure of 
Negotiation 
Bilateral 
negotiation 
Bilateral 
negotiation 
Mediation Poor design and 
manage to 
dispute 
resolution 
process 
 
Agendas of 
Negotiation 
Environmental 
Impact, water 
quality, 
economic effect. 
Environmental 
Impact, water 
quality, 
economic effect, 
alternatives 
Environmental 
Impact, water 
quality, 
economic effect. 
Ended up pros 
and corns 
 
 
Joint fact-
finding 
absence Absence Absence Fail to fact-
finding 
Tools to 
promote 
agreement 
Absence Absence Absence Fail to 
productive 
dialogue 
  
 
 
 
 
                                            
27) Ju,jae-bok, “Reconcile System of policy conflict between government and 
organization: comparative study of the river of DONGGANG project and 
SAEMANGUM project”, 2004 
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Ⅴ. CONCLUSION 
 
A.COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO CASEES 
There are similar characteristics to conflict between the CALFED Water Use 
Efficiency (WUE) program and the SAEMANGUM reclamation project. First, 
they have conflict structures between resource-seawater-exploitation and 
environment protection and are representative conflict cases both in U.S and in 
Korea. The conflict of the CALFED WUE program is between improvement of 
water supply reliability and protection of Bay-Delta Ecosystem. In addition, the 
conflict of the SAEMANGUM project is between making farmland and physical 
distribution site and protection of tideland. 
 
Second, in those cases there was need to solve the scientific and technical 
uncertainty. In the CALFED WUE program, it should examine the water 
conservation potential by offering the efficient water management practice and 
the SAEMANGUM project, the forecast of range in tideland destruction and the 
estimation between tideland and farmland should be defined. Lastly, the 
government was a key stakeholder to conflict and the multiple parties involved 
in those cases. In CALFED WUE program, stakeholders are federal government, 
 63
state government, agricultural users and environmental groups. There are also 
stakeholders such as federal government, local government, environmental 
groups, religion groups and local residents.  
In addition, there was effort to resolve the conflict through negotiation among 
stakeholders in those cases. The result of negotiation in those cases, however, 
was different because of employing different processes and methods in dispute 
resolution. This difference is the following factors. 
 
Difference of negotiation structure 
While in the CALFED WUE program, mediated negotiation was carried on by 
supporting the neutral, actually bilateral negotiation without the neutral was 
going on in the SAEMANGUM project. In CALFED WUE case, mediated 
dialogue was invited to resolve the impasse among stakeholders. The 
SAEMANGUM project was under governmental lead, just experts nominated by 
both government and dissent groups participated in negotiation. As a result of 
this difference in negotiation, the result of negotiation was different. In the 
CALFED WUE program, by supporting the neutral the productive dialogue 
proceeded based on trust building among stakeholders, as well as, the effective 
process to resolve the conflict was employed. On the contrary, there was no 
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attempt to overcome unilateral debate and adversary confrontation among 
stakeholders in the SAEMANGUM project. It seems that the result of mediated 
negotiation by supporting the neutral is more effective rather than bilateral 
negotiation in resource and environmental dispute. 
 
Difference of process and method for scientific inquiry 
There was a difference in seeking the scientific and technical uncertainty in those 
cases. First, in the CALFED WUE program, the neural expert never engaged in 
any stakeholders assembled to examine the scientific information. However, 
experts nominated by stakeholders centered to solve the science uncertainty in 
the SAEMANGUM project. This was essentially to find non-objective 
information. Second, while the CALFED WUE program, the methodology to 
study about science questions was agreed by all stakeholders, therefore to scope, 
to review and to incorporate resulted since information into decision-making 
policy had been agreed upon. This provided the legitimacy of scientific inquiry 
and resulted in credible data. In contrast, there was no agreement to define the 
methodology to seek scientific information by stakeholders. In addition to this, 
there was no attempt to scope, review and to incorporate science information 
jointly into decision-making policy. All scientific inquiry was completely 
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individual. Under this condition, it was not easy to overcome so called 
“adversary science.”28 Last, the form of public hearing could not solve the 
science questions without a well designed process and methods. Overall it seems 
that there is no the legitimacy of process in scientific inquiry in the 
SAEMANGUM project.  
 
Difference of negotiation approach 
In order to resolve acute conflicts with different interests and values, the trust 
building, as well as, mutual gains approach is significant. In the CALFED WUE 
program, stakeholders by supporting the neutral parties tried to improve the 
relationship and to seek the common base and finally ended up integrating water 
supply reliability and environment protection. However, in the SAEMANGUM 
project, there was no trying to improve the relationship and to seek the common 
base. In particular, stakeholders just persisted in their position as hard as flint. 
The government completely denied any alternative to restrict the purpose of the 
project and environmental groups also centered on the environmental side in 
early stages. There was no attempt to advance a mutual gains approach 
negotiation. Poorly defined agendas in negotiation were a crucial factor in the 
                                            
28)Some parties use science as a means of influencing a policy outcome. By hiding 
their interests behind a scientific report, some stakeholders are able to push for a 
policy outcome most favorable to them. This is often called adversary science.  
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SAEMANGUM project.  
 
Difference of attitude and skills to negotiation 
In the CALFED WUE program, CALFED independent affiliation under 
government completely tried to resolve the conflict by a stakeholder 
involvement and consensus building approach. CALFED convened mediated 
negotiation to break the impasse and integrated by supporting the neutral parties 
in the public involvement into independent panel deliberation instead the 
original plan. Stakeholders such as agricultural users and environmental groups 
also did not give up the attitude to resolve the conflict by collaborative 
negotiation. In addition, all stakeholders could obtain the effective skill to 
exchange their interest in negotiation. On the contrary, in the SAEMANGUM 
project, the government denied extra meetings to resolve the conflict stating 
there was lack of legitimacy in the dispute resolution process, as well as, 
distorted the result of the joint inquiry committee and the evaluation committee. 
It also had no tools to generate agreement in negotiation and no effective skill of 
negotiation among stakeholders. Consequently, it seemed that there was less 
collaborative attitude among stakeholders and poor skill in negotiation in the 
SAEMANGUM project. This essentially made it fail to get agreement. Figure 5 
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show note the difference to dispute resolution in those cases 
 
 
<Table 4> Comparison of Process to dispute resolution in two cases 
 
              Process & Methods  Outcome 
Structure of 
negotiation 
Science Inquiry Negotiation 
approach  
Attitude & tools 
 
CALFED 
WUE 
program 
 
 
 
  
 Mediated 
negotiation 
 
Joint fact-
finding centered 
the neutral 
experts  
 
 mutual 
gains 
approach 
-collaborative effort  
-conflict assessment, 
single-text 
negotiation, ground 
rules  
-legitimacy of 
process 
-credible science 
information 
-getting 
agreement 
 
SAEMANGU
-M 
project 
 
 
 
 
 Bilateral 
negotiation 
 
Individual fact-
finding centered 
experts 
nominated by 
stakeholders 
 
Zero-sum 
approach : 
ending up 
pros and 
cons 
- lack of 
collaborative effort 
 
- absence of ground 
rule and any tools t 
- lack of 
legitimacy of 
process 
- absence of 
credible date 
-fail to 
agreement 
 
 
B.USEFULNESS AND TASK OF CONSENSUS BUILDING APPROACH 
 
Usefulness of consensus building approach 
The conflict in resource and environmental fields restrained collaborative effort 
among stakeholders because of acute confrontation with different interests and 
values. This kind of conflicts also becomes more serious by adding problems 
such as the value of scarce resource and the scientific uncertainty. As a result of 
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those reasons, the conflict caused adversary distrust, political confrontation and 
litigation among stakeholders and this conflict tends to be protracted. This cost is 
too huge. Thus, what is needed is that the conflict be resolved not by 
confrontation and litigation but by appropriate alternatives including proper 
processes and methods. Regarding this, a consensus building approach is likely 
to be an appropriate alternative both in the U.S. and in Korea. This approach 
includes important factors: 1) mutual gains approach negotiation through all 
stakeholder involvement; 2) integration stakeholder interest and decision 
maker’s concern of scientific information; 3) use of tools to generate agreement 
including stakeholder assessment; 4) the neutral parties involvement to design 
and manage the process to dispute resolution.  
 
Finally, it seems that the consensus building approach causes the legitimacy of 
the dispute resolution process and the sound outcome. It also is likely to be 
suitable to resolve the conflict to resource and environment filed in Korea. There 
are several reasons to explain this argument. 
 
First, according to the result of two cases study, a consensus building approach is 
significantly effective to resolve the conflicts. Those cases show that the conflict 
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resolution needs both collaborative efforts among stakeholders and an 
appropriate process and method to resolve the conflict. The CALFED WUE 
program shows that there are crucial factors to resolve the conflict such as; 1) 
mediated negotiation approach; 2) joint fact-finding process; 3) tools to 
generating agreement (e.g. conflict assessment); 4) collaborative effort among 
stakeholders. In this case, a consensus building approach resulted in successful 
outcome.  In contrast, in the SAEMANGUM project, the lack of appropriate 
process and methods ended up in failure to get agreement such as; 1) bilateral 
negotiation; 2) zero-sum based negotiation; 3) absence of joint fact-finding 
process; 4) no tools to generate agreement (e.g. ground rules); 5) lacking 
collaborative effort. Regarding this, a consensus building approach would be one 
of the alternatives to overcome these shortcomings. 
 
Second, a consensus building approach has potential to resolve other conflicts in 
Korea. To be specific, in the conflict to high-speed railway construction in the 
CHEONSUNG Mountain, this conflict finally is meant to be resolved through 
joint-fact finding process by participating stakeholders and neutral experts. This 
reflected that bilateral negotiation had a limitation to resolve the conflict and the 
dispute resolution was impossible without seeking scientific information jointly. 
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After all, this case shows that the effort to improve the legitimacy of the dispute 
resolution is quite important. A consensus building approach can enhance the 
legitimacy of dispute resolution process by providing all stakeholders’ 
involvement and joint fact-finding process.  
 
Last, the failure in the court mediation to the SAEMANGUM project shows that 
the legal process to resolve conflict has a significant defect. It seems that the 
legal process can not solve effectively the science debate in environmental 
conflict, as well as, to integrate successfully the different interests and values 
among stakeholders. Even though the court deliberated about the conflict 
surrounding the SAEMANGUM project for about four years, it just provided the 
recommendation to urge bilateral negotiation and a consensus based decision. In 
this case, it is clear that protracted litigation has a crucial defect to effectively 
resolve various conflicts. In order to resolve acute conflict in the environmental 
field, the practical stakeholder’s involvement and consensus based negotiation 
are essentially crucial. 
 
Tasks of employing consensus building approach 
There are several conditions to employ a consensus building approach to 
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resolving disputes with resource and environment filed in Korea. Key 
stakeholders should participate in negotiation table and well trained facilitator 
(mediator) should exist. In addition proper resources are needed such as time, 
finance, experts and should be guaranteed. The institutionalization of dispute 
resolution such as law is also important. 
First, the conflict resolution by negotiation basically depends on the stakeholder 
viewing the benefit through negotiation as larger than denying participation in 
negotiation. Thus, it is important that the benefit to negotiation should be 
provided and stakeholder should maintain a collaborative attitude. Mutual gains 
approach negotiation, fairness of dispute resolution process and socialization of 
benefit to negotiation would assist to overcome those problems. 
 
Second, the role of facilitator (mediator) is quite crucial in a consensus building 
approach. In this model, the facilitator is mean to effectively design and manage 
the process of dispute resolution. Specific application of this model should be 
employed differently depending on the specific situation in conflict. The 
facilitator takes responsibility for this effort. However, there was no well trained 
facilitator in resource and environmental dispute in Korea. Thus, it should be 
answered how to foster facilitators effectively. 
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Third, proper resources are needed such as time, finance, experts and should be 
guaranteed. a Time and money are needed in promoting trust building among 
stakeholders and employing a professional facilitator, In particular, promoting 
mediator service to environmental dispute, the market for this service should be 
generated. The role of the neutral solving science uncertainty is quite important. 
 
Last, in a long-term point of view, the institutionalization of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) is crucial. In order to achieve this, Susskind29 says that the 
effort to promote ADR service is needed in both supply and demand at the same 
time30. While government should try to demand ADR service, academic and civil 
society should offer ADR service. Also, the institutionalization built depends on 
Korean situation. 
 
In part, this paper has a defect of generalization. The final decision of application 
to consensus building approach is not determined by just two case analyses. The 
real usefulness of this approach would be proven through practical 
experimentation and inspection of its result. Additional studies on this issue will 
                                            
29 )Lawrence E. Susskind is Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at 
MIT, President of the Consensus Building Institute, and Director of the Public Dispute 
Program at Harvard Law School. 
30) Personal Interview, 5 June 2005  
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be necessary.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Lawrence Susskind, Field, P.. Dealing with an Angry Public. New York, NY: 
Free Pres,1996. 
 
 Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, and others. The Consensus Building 
Handbook: A complete Guide to Reaching Agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications,1999.  
 
Pruitt, Dean G., Jeffrey, Z. Rubin. Social conflict: escalation, stalemate and 
settlement. New York, NY: Academic Press,1986. 
 
William breslin, Jeffrey Z. Rubin and others. Negotiation theory and Practice. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard law school,1993.  
 
Lawrence Susskind, Patrick Field, Mieke Van der Wansem and Jenifer Peyer. 
“Integrating Scientific Information, Stakeholder Interests, and Political Concerns 
in Resource and Environmental Planning and Management” Kevin S. Hanna, D. 
Scott Slocombe and others. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming, Fall, 2005. 
 
Dukes, Franklin E. Resolving Public Conflict., Manchester and New York 
Manchester University Press,1996. 
 
Lawrence Susskind and Jeffery Cruikshank. Breaking Robert’s Rules: The 
consensus building alternative to parliamentary procedure. Cambridge MA: 
MIT-Harvard Public Policy Dispute Resolution Program, 2005.  
 
  R. M. Solomon, S. Yonts-Shepard, and others. “Public Involvement under NEPA: 
Trends and Opportunities” in Environmental Policy and NEPA: Past, Present, 
and Future, Ray Clark and Larry Canter, eds. Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press, 
2000.  
 
Jenifer Leigh Peyser. “How does participation in the framing, Review, and 
Incorporation of scientific Information Affect stakeholder perspectives on 
Resource Management Decisions” diss., MIT U .2005    
Howard Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press/Harvard University Press,1982. 
 
 75
D.A. Lax and J. K .Sebenius. The Manager as Negotiator. New York: The Free 
Press,1986. 
 
Fisher, Robert, William Ury and Bruce Patton. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without 
Giving In (Second Edition). Houghton Mifflin Company,1991.   
 
S.L. Star and J. R. Griesemer. “Institutional ecology, ‘translations’ and boundary 
objects.” Social Studies of Science 19(3) ,1989.  
 
Scott McCreary, John Gamman and others. “Applying a Mediated Negotiation 
Framework to Integrated Coastal Zone Management.” Coastal Management 29, 
2001.    
 
Agricultural Water Use Efficiency Assurances. “ Stakeholder Focus Group I issue 
Audit” 1998.   
 
Boyd W. Fuller. “Mediating Irreconcilable Conflict: Agricultural Water Use 
Efficiency, CALFED and California”, 2003   
 
CALFED Bay-Delta Program and CONCUR, Inc. Summary Report: Independent 
Review Panel on Agricultural Water Conservation Potential. 1998.  
 
Kim Myung Sik. “SAEMANGUM and Deliberative decision-making”,  
The Institute of Philosophy Research, 2001  
 
Choi Mi Hee. “Measure for integrating economic validity assessment of l large 
public investment project and environmental assessment”, diss., SKK U, 2002 
 
Ju,Jae-Bok. “Reconcile System of policy conflict between government and 
organization: comparative study of the river of DONGGANG project and 
SAEMANGUM project”, The Korea Institute of Public Administration, 2004 
